Specifying the domain-general resources that contribute to conceptual construction: Evidence from the child's acquisition of vitalist biology.
There are two dissociable processes that underlie knowledge acquisition: knowledge enrichment, which involves learning information that can be represented with one's current conceptual repertoire; and conceptual construction, which involves acquiring knowledge that can only be represented in terms of concepts one does not yet possess. Theory changes involving conceptual change require conceptual construction. The cognitive mechanisms underlying conceptual change are still poorly understood, though executive function capacities have been implicated. The present study concerns the domain-general resources drawn upon in one well-studied case of the construction of a new framework theory in early childhood: the framework theory of vitalist biology, the ontogenetically earliest theory in which the concepts life and death come to have biological content shared with adults. Eighty-three five- and six-year-old children were tested on a battery of tasks that probe central concepts of the vitalist theory, as well as on a battery of tests of domain-general capacities that may be implicated in development in this domain, including measures of knowledge enrichment, executive function, and fluid IQ. With variance in accumulated knowledge and in knowledge enrichment capacity controlled, two specific executive functions, shifting and inhibition, predicted children's progress in constructing the vitalist theory. In contrast, working memory and fluid IQ were not associated with the acquisition of vitalist biology. These results provide further evidence for the distinction between knowledge enrichment and conceptual construction and impose new constraints on accounts of the mechanisms underlying conceptual construction in this domain.